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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/02/2011 Accident number: 596 
Accident time: 07:42 Accident Date: 10/11/2009 





Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 07/12/2009 
ID original source: OPS, 14101-30 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/02/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons 
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be 
revised as more information becomes available. 
The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS, 14101-30 
To: See distribution list 
From: [Name removed], Chief of Operations MACCA, Kabul 
Date: 07 December 2009 
 
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] DT-12 
FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT 
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] DT-12 




Complete Investigation: [Demining group] 
Lessons Learned: 
MCPA, RONCO, MDC, OMAR, DOG, JMAS, ATC, PMIWRA, HDI, DAFA, AGMA, EODT, 
ACL, CMCC, MTI, NDSS, PSS, UXB, AMACs (7). 
For information: MACCA, Chief of Staff DMC, Director Operations Staff 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]- DT-12 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
A Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by MACCA Programme Director to investigate the 
circumstances caused a fatal accident involving [the Victim] the Team Leader of [Demining 
group] DT-12. The accident occurred at 07:42 hours on 10 Nov. 2009 at Task No: [Demining 
group] # 3226 in Surkhi village, Jabalsiraj district of Parwan province. But as the internal and 
external investigation reports received by MACCA and these reports cover the contributing 
factors to this accident, so this BOI report is written based on both investigation reports. 
SUMMARY: 
This site is located close to the residential area of Surkhi village and was a military base 
during the Russian invasion and time of the Russian backed government. There were anti-
personnel mines laid to protect the military positions and base from the attack by the 
Mujahidin. After the withdrawal of the Russian forces and subsequent fall of the Najibullah 
government, the Mujahidin had also planted anti-personnel mines around their military 
positions. To date the area has experienced two accidents to humans and five against 
animals. 
The clearance operation on mentioned task was started by [Demining group] DT-12 on 1st of 
November 09. On 10th of November 09 at 07:40, while the second break period started, the 
team leader of the team asked a deminer for his scraper and then walked down to a 
clearance lane without informing any other team members of his intention. On 07:42 Team 
leader initiated a POMZ mine causing him to receive the injuries that led to his death. He 
ignored his job description and the [Demining group] SOPs. He may have been thinking that 
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this POMZ is of no danger, so that may be why he has removed his PPE and started to 
disturb the mine. 
There was also an incident involving POMZ mines which the Team Leader should have taken 
them into consideration but were ignored. One POMZ mine was initiated by a deminer by 
pulling its wire in September 2008 and another more recently when a POMZ was detonated 
earlier this month as part of the preparation process. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The accident occurred because of carelessness of [the VIctim] as he started to work in 
contrary to [Demining group] SOPs and breached safety by removing his PPE before 
performing the possible excavation drill on a POMZ mine. He was not assigned to use 
scraper in the minefield, but his main function was to supervise and control the activities of his 
team. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following points are to be considered: 
A. All demining staff is to be informed of the circumstances of the accident and be reminded 
of the consequences of not wearing PPE during operations. 
B. Removal of PPE is not permitted for anyone inside the minefield while conducting any kind 
of operations. 
C. Team leaders should be reminded to strictly adhere to SOPs and ensure they not only 
control their teams during operations but are also acting in a safe manner at all times 
themselves. 
D. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required 
to be submitted to MACCA operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the 
issue date of this letter. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 780 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Short frontal vest Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No medical report made available. 
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because 
the Victim was a field supervisor who operated in breach of the Demining group’s SOPs 
without correction. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” for the same 
reason. The provision of body armour that is not IMAS compliant was another Management 
failing, but not relevant when the PPE was not worn at all. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
also in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are meant to apply. The 
summary of the accident includes the statement that two comprehensive accident 
investigations were made, but not made available for others to learn from. 
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